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Abstract
Almost all of the work in graphical models for game theory has mir-
rored previous work in probabilistic graphical models. Our work considers
the opposite direction: Taking advantage of recent advances in equilib-
rium computation for probabilistic inference. In particular, we present
formulations of inference problems in Markov random fields (MRFs) as
computation of equilibria in a certain class of game-theoretic graphical
models. While some previous work explores this direction, none of that
work concretely establishes the precise connection between variational
probabilistic inference in MRFs and correlated equilibria. There is no
work that exploits recent theoretical and empirical results from the lit-
erature on algorithmic and computational game theory on the tractable,
polynomial-time computation of exact or approximate correlated equilib-
ria in graphical games with arbitrary, loopy graph structure. Our work
discusses how to design new algorithms with equally tractable guarantees
for the computation of approximate variational inference in MRFs. In ad-
dition, inspired by a previously stated game-theoretic view of state-of-the-
art tree-reweighed (TRW) message-passing techniques for belief inference
as zero-sum game, we propose a different, general-sum potential game to
design approximate fictitious-play techniques. We perform synthetic ex-
periments evaluating our proposed approximation algorithms with stan-
dard methods and TRW on several classes of classical Ising models (i.e.,
with binary random variables). We also evaluate the algorithms using
Ising models learned from the MNIST dataset. Our experiments show
that our global approach is competitive, particularly shinning in a class
of Ising models with constant, “highly attractive” edge-weights, in which
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it is often better than all other alternatives we evaluated. With a notable
exception, our more local approach was not as effective as our global ap-
proach or TRW. Yet, in fairness, almost all of the alternatives are often
no better than a simple baseline: estimate the marginal probability to be
0.5.
1 Introduction
Almost all of the work in graphical games has borrowed heavily from analogies
to probabilistic graphical models. Yet, over-reliance on those analogies and
previous standard approaches to exact inference might have led that approach
to face the same computational roadblocks that plagued most exact-inference
techniques.
As an example of work that heavily exploits previous work in probablistic
graphical models (PGMs), Kakade et al. [2003] designed polynomial-time algo-
rithms based on linear programming for computing correlated equilibria (CE) in
standard graphical games with tree graphs. The approach and polynomial-time
results extend to graphical games with bounded-tree-width graphs and graph-
ical polymatrix games with tree graphs. Exact inference is tractable in PGMs
whose graphs have bounded treewidth, but intractable in general [Cooper, 1990,
Shimony, 1994, Istrail, 2000]. In 2005, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden showed
the intractability of computing the “social-welfare” optimum CE in arbitrary
graphical games (see also Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008]). Everything
seemed to point toward an eventual resignation that the approach of Kakade
et al. [2003], along with any other approach to the problem for that matter, had
hit the “bounded-treewidth-threshold wall.”
Yet, soon after, Papadimitriou [2005] took a radically different approach
to the problem, and surprised the community with an efficient algorithm for
computing CE not only in graphical games, but also in almost all known com-
pactly representable games. Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2015a] built upon Pa-
padimitriou’s idea to provide what most people would consider an improved
polynomial-time algorithm, because of the simplification of the CE that their
algorithm outputs (see also Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2011, for a summary). 1
An immediate question that arises from the algorithmic results just described
is, what is so fundamentally different between the problem of exact inference in
graphical models and equilibrium computation that made this result possible in
the context of graphical games? Of course, CE, probabilistic inference, and their
variants are different problems, even within the same framework of graphical
models. The question is, how different are they?
It is well-known that pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is inherently
a classical/standard discrete constraints satisfaction problem (CSP). It is also
1Papadimitriou’s work has an interesting history, which Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2015a]
nicely summarize. Some questions arose at the time about the technical soundness in the
description of some steps in Papadimitriou’s algorithm. Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2015a]
provided clarifications to those steps.
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well-known that any CSP can be cast as a most-likely, or equivalently, a max-
imum a posteriori (MAP) assignment estimation problem in Markov random
fields (MRFs). 2 Through this connection, it is clear that there exists a MAP
formulation of PSNE. But what about other, more general forms of equilibria?
We present here a formulation of the problem of equilibrium computation as
a kind of local conditions for different approximations to belief inference. Simi-
larly, we show how one can view some special games, called graphical potential
games [Ortiz, 2015], as defining an equivalent MRF whose “locally optimal” so-
lutions correspond to arbitrary equilibria of the game. Hence, Papadimitriou’s
result, and later that of Jiang and Leyton-Brown, open up the possibility that at
least new classes of problems in probabilistic graphical models could be solved
exactly and efficiently. The question is, which classes?
While we provide specific connections between the two fields that yield im-
mediate theoretical and computational implications, we also provide practical
alternatives that result from those connections. That is, the foundation of
both Papadimitriou’s and Jiang and Leyton-Brown’s algorithms is the ellip-
soid method, which is one approach that leads to the polynomial-time algorithm
for linear programming. This approach, while provably efficient in theory, is
often seen as less practical as other alternatives such as so-called interior-point
methods. This is in contrast to the simple linear programs that are possible for
certain classes of graphical games [Kakade et al., 2003]. Are there simpler and
practically effective variants of Papadimitriou’s or Jiang and Leyton-Brown’s
algorithms? While the last question is an important open question, we do not
address it directly in this paper. Instead, We employ ideas from the literature
of learning in games [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999], particularly no-regret algo-
rithms and fictitious play, to propose two specific instances of game-theoretic
inspired, practical, and effective heuristics for belief inference in MRFs. One
heuristic takes a local approach, and the other takes a global approach. We
evaluate our proposed algorithms within the context of the most popular, stan-
dard, and state-of-art techniques from the literature in probabilistic graphical
models.
This manuscript describes our work, which starts to address some of the
questions above, and reports on our progress.
1.1 Overview of the Paper
Section 2 provides preliminary material, introducing basic notation, terminol-
ogy, and concepts from graphical models and game theory.
Section 3 is the main technical section of the paper. It shows reductions of
different problems in belief inference in MRFs as computing equilibria in graph-
ical potential games compactly represented as Gibbs potential games [Ortiz,
2015]. The reductions presented here vary in generality from MAP assignment,
marginals, and full-joint estimation to pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE),
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE), and correlated equilibria (CE), respec-
2Assuming a solution exists, of course; otherwise the resulting MRF is not well-defined.
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tively. We briefly discuss a connection between Papadimitriou’s algorithm, as
well as Jiang and Leyton-Brown’s, and the work of Jaakkola and Jordan [1997]
on variational approximations to the problem of probabilistic inference in MRFs
via mean-field mixtures. The paper also includes a discussion on the connec-
tions to previous work in computer vision on the problem of relaxation labeling,
and work on game-theoretic approaches to (Bayesian) statistical estimation. We
then present an alternative approach based on a more global view of the prob-
lem, in contrast to the more local approach of the formulations mentioned above.
More specifically, we formulate the inference problem using a two-player poten-
tial game, inspired by the work on tree reweighed (TRW) message-passing [Wain-
wright et al., 2005]. We propose a special type of sequential, “hybrid” standard
and stochastic fictitious play algorithm for belief inference.
Section 4 reports on our experimental evaluation. We compare our pro-
posed algorithms to the popular, most commonly used, standard, and easily
implementable approximation techniques in use today.
Section 5 discusses future work and suggests new opportunities for other po-
tential research directions, beyond those already discussed in the main technical
sections of the paper.
Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of our contributions.
2 Preliminaries
This section introduces basic notation and concepts in graphical models and
game theory used throughout the paper. It also includes brief statements on
current state-of-the-art mathematical and computational results in the area.
Basic Notation. Denote by x ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) an n-dimensional vector
and by x−i ≡ (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) the same vector without component
i. Similarly, for every set S ⊂ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n}, denote by xS ≡ (xi : i ∈ S) the
(sub-)vector formed from x using only components in S, such that, letting Sc ≡
[n] − S denote the complement of S, we can denote x ≡ (xS , xSc) ≡ (xi, x−i)
for every i. If A1, . . . , An are sets, denote by A ≡ ×i∈[n]Ai, A−i ≡ ×j∈[n]−{i}Aj
and AS ≡ ×j∈SAj .
Graph Terminology and Notation. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected
graph, with finite set of n vertices or nodes V = {1, . . . , n} and a set of (undi-
rected) edges E. For each node i, let N (i) ≡ {j | (i, j) ∈ E} be the set of
neighbors of i in G, not including i, and N(i) ≡ N (i) ∪ {i} the set including i.
A clique C of G is a set of nodes with the property that they are all mutually
connected: for all i, j ∈ C, (i, j) ∈ E; in addition, C is maximal if there is no
other node k outside C that is also connected to each node in C, i.e., for all
k ∈ V − C, (k, i) /∈ E for some i ∈ C.
Another useful concept in the context of this paper is that of hypergraphs,
which are generalizations of regular graphs. A hypergraph graph G = (V, E) is
defined by a set of nodes V and a set of hyperedges E ⊂ 2V . We can think of
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the hyperedges as cliques in a regular graph. Indeed, the primal graph of the
hypergraph is the graph induced by the node set V and where there is an edge
between two nodes if they both belong to the same hyperedge; in other words,
the primal graph is the graph induced by taking each hyperedge and forming
cliques of nodes in a regular graph.
2.1 Probabilistic Graphical Models
Probabilistic graphical models are an elegant marriage of probability and graph
theory that has had tremendous impact in the theory and practice of modern
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics. It has permitted effective
modeling of large, structured high-dimensional complex systems found in the
real world. The language of probabilistic graphical models allows us to capture
the structure of complex interactions between individual entities in the system
within a single model. The core component of the model is a graph in which each
node i corresponds to a random variable Xi and the edges express conditional
independence assumptions about those random variables in the probabilistic
system.
2.1.1 Markov Random Fields, Gibbs Distributions, and
the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem
By definition, a joint probability distribution P is a Markov random field (MRF)
with respect to (wrt) an undirected graph G if for all x, for every node i,
P (Xi = xi | X−i = x−i) = P (Xi = xi | XN (i) = xN (i)). In that case, the
neighbors/variables XN (i) form the Markov blanket of node/variable Xi.
Also by definition, a joint distribution P is a Gibbs distribution wrt an
undirected graph G if it can be expressed as P (X = x) =
∏
C∈C ΦC(xC) for
some functions ΦC indexed by a clique C ∈ C, the set of all (maximal) cliques in
G, and mapping every possible value xC that the random variablesXc associated
with the nodes in C can take to a non-negative number.
We say that a joint probability distribution P is positive if it has full support
(i.e., P (x) > 0 for all x). 3
Theorem 1. (Hammersley-Clifford [Hammersley and Clifford, 1971])
Let P be a positive joint probability distribution. Then, P is an MRF with
respect to G if and only if P is a Gibbs distribution with respect to G.
In the context of the theorem, the functions ΦC are positive, which allows us
to define MRFs in terms of local potential functions {φC} over each clique C
in the graph. Define the function Ψ(x) ≡ ∑C∈C φC(xC). Let us refer to any
function of this form as a Gibbs potential with respect to G. A more familiar
expression of an MRF is P (X = x) ∝ exp(∑C∈C φC(xC)) = exp(Ψ(x)).
3The positivity constraint is only necessary for the “only if” case proof of the theorem.
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2.1.2 Some Inference-Related Problems in MRFs
One problem of interest in an MRF is to compute a most likely assignment
x∗ ∈ arg maxx P (X = x) = arg maxx
∑
C∈C φC(xC)); that is, the most likely
outcome with respect to the MRF P . Another problem is to compute the in-
dividual marginal probabilities P (Xi = xi) =
∑
x−i P (Xi = xi, X−i = x−i) ∝∑
x−i exp(
∑
C∈C φC(xC))) for each variable Xi. A related problem is to com-
pute the normalizing constant Z =
∑
x exp(
∑
C∈C φC(xC))) (also known as the
partition function of the MRF).
Another set of problems concern so called “belief updating.” That is, com-
puting information related to the posterior probability distribution P ′ having
observed the outcome of some of the variables, also known as the evidence. For
MRFs, this problem is computationally equivalent to that of computing prior
marginal probabilities.
2.1.3 Brief Overview of Computational Results in
Probabilistic Graphical Models
Both the exact and approximate versions of most inference-related problems
in MRFs are in general intractable (e.g., NP-hard), although polynomial-time
algorithms do exists for some special cases (see, e.g., Dagum and Luby, 1993,
Roth, 1996, Istrail, 2000, Wang et al., 2013, and the references therein). The
complexity of exact algorithms is usually characterized by structural properties
of the graph, and the typical statement is that running times are polynomial
only for graphs with bounded treewidth (see, e.g., Russell and Norvig, 2003
for more information). Several deterministic and randomized approximation
approaches exist (see, e.g., Jordan et al., 1999, Jaakkola, 2000, Geman and Ge-
man, 1984). An approximation approach of particular interest in this paper
is variational inference [Jordan et al., 1999, Jaakkola, 2000]. Roughly speak-
ing, the general idea is to approximate an intractable MRF P by a “closest”
probability distribution Q∗ within a “computationally tractable” class Q: for-
mally, Q∗ ∈ arg maxQ∈QKL(Q ‖ P ), where KL(Q ‖ P ) ≡
∑
xQ(x) ln
Q(x)
P (x) is
the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between probability distributions P and
Q wrt Q. The simplest example in the so called mean-field (MF) approxi-
mation, in which Q = {Q | Q(x) = ∏iQ(xi) for all x ∈ Ω} consists of all
possible product distributions. Even if P is an IM, no closed-form solution
exists for its mean-field approximation, and the most common computational
scheme is based on simple axis parallel optimizations, leading to individual lo-
cal conditions of optimality and potential local minima: that is, the problem is
essentially reduced to finding Q∗(x) =
∏
iQ
∗
i (xi) such that for all i, we have
Q∗i ∈ arg maxQi
∑
xi
Qi(xi)
∑
x−i
[∏
j 6=iQ
∗
j (xj)
]
Ψ(xi, x−i) + HQi(Xi), where
H(Qi) ≡ HQi(Xi) ≡ −
∑
xi
Qi(xi) lnQi(xi) is the (Shannon) entropy of ran-
dom variable Xi ∼ Qi.
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2.2 Game Theory
Game theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947] provides a mathematical
model of the stable behavior (or outcome) that may result from the interaction
of rational individuals. This paper concentrates on noncooperative settings: in-
dividuals maximize their own utility, act independently, and do not have (direct)
control over the behavior of others. 4
The concept of equilibrium is central to game theory. Roughly, an equilib-
rium in a noncooperative game is a point of strategic stance, where no individual
player can gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium behavior.
2.2.1 Games and their Representation
Let V = [n] denote a finite set of n players in a game. For each player i ∈
V , let Ai denote the set of actions or pure strategies that i can play. Let
A ≡ ×i∈VAi denote the set of joint actions, x ≡ (xi, . . . , xn) ∈ A denote a
joint action, and xi the individual action of player i in x. Denote by x−i ≡
(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) the joint action of all the players except i, such that
x ≡ (xi, x−i). Let Mi : A → R denote the payoff/utility function of player i.
If the Ai’s are finite, then Mi is called the payoff matrix of player i. Games
represented this way are called normal- or strategic-form games.
There are a variety of compact representations for large games inspired by
probabilistic graphical models in AI and machine learning [La Mura, 2000,
Kearns et al., 2001, Koller and Milch, 2003, Leyton-Brown and Tennenholtz,
2003, Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2008]. The results of this paper are presented
in the context of the following generalization of graphical games [Kearns et al.,
2001], a simple but powerful model inspired by probabilistic graphical models
such as MRFs previously defined by Ortiz [2014]. 5
Definition 1. A graphical multi-hypermatrix game (GMhG) is defined by
• a directed graph G = (V,E) in which there is a node i ∈ V in G for each
of the n players in the game (i.e., |V | = n), and the set of directed edges,
or arcs, E defines a set of neighbors N (i) ≡ {j | (j, i) ∈ E, i 6= j} whose
action affect the payoff function of i (i.e., j is a neighbor of i if and only
if there is an arc from j to i); and
• for each player i ∈ V ,
– a set of actions Ai,
4Individual rationality here means that each player seeks to maximize their own utility.
Also note that, while many parlor “win-lose”/zero-sum games involve competition, in general,
noncooperative 6= competitive: each player just wants to do the best for himself, regardless of
how useful or harmful his behavior is to others.
5Connections have already been established between the different kinds of compact repre-
sentations [Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2008], which may facilitate extensions of ideas, frame-
works, and results to those alternative models.
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– a hypergraph where the vertex set is its (inclusive) neighborhood
N(i) ≡ N (i)∪{i} and the hyperedge set is a set of cliques of players
Ci ⊂ 2N(i), and
– a set {M ′i,C : AC → R | C ∈ Ci} of local-clique payoff (hyper)matrices.
The interpretation of a GMhG is that, for each player i, the local and global
payoff (hyper)matrices M ′i : AN(i) → R and Mi : A → R of i are (implicitly)
defined as M ′i(xN(i)) ≡
∑
C∈CiM
′
i,C(xC) and Mi(x) ≡M ′i(xN(i)), respectively.
Graphical potential games. Graphical potential games are special instances
of GMhGs. They play a key role in establishing a stronger connection between
probabilistic inference in MRFs and equilibria in games than previously noted.
Ortiz [2015] provides a characterization of graphical potential games, and dis-
cusses the implication of convergence of certain kinds of “playing” processes in
games based on connections to the Gibbs sampler [Geman and Geman, 1984],
via the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem [Hammersley and Clifford, 1971, Besag,
1974]. Yu and Berthod [1995] (implicitly) used graphical potential games to
establish an equivalence between local maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) inference
in Markov random fields and Nash equilibria of the game, a topic revisited in
Section 3.1. 6
2.2.2 Equilibria as Solution Concepts
Equilibria are generally considered the solutions of games. Various notions of
equilibria exist. A pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium (PSNE) of a game is a
joint action x∗ such that for all players i, and for all actions xi, Mi(x∗i , x
∗
−i) ≥
Mi(xi, x
∗
−i). That is, no player can improve its payoff by unilaterally deviating
from its prescribed equilibrium x∗i , assuming the others stick to their actions
x∗−i. Some games, such as the extensively-studied Prisoner’s Dilemma, have
PSNE; many others, such as “playground” Rock-Paper-Scissors, do not. This is
problematic because it will not be possible to “solve” some games using PSNE.
A mixed-strategy of player i is a probability distribution Qi over Ai such
that Q(xi) is the probability that i chooses to play action xi.
7 A joint mixed-
strategy is a joint probability distribution Q capturing the players behavior,
such that Q(x) is the probability that joint action x is played, or in other
words, each player i plays action in component xi of x. Because we are assum-
ing that the players play independently, Q is a product distribution: Q(x) =∏
iQi(xi). Denote by Q−i(x−i) ≡
∏
j 6=iQj(xj) the joint mixed strategies of all
the players except i. The expected payoff of a player i when some joint mixed-
strategy Q is played is
∑
xQ(x)Mi(x); abusing notation, denote it by Mi(Q).
6In the interest of brevity, please see Ortiz [2014] for a thorough discussion of GMhGs,
including their compact representation size and connections to other classical classes of games
in game theory.
7Note that the sets of mixed strategies contain pure strategies, as we can always recover
playing a pure strategy exclusively.
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The conditional expected payoff of a player i given that he plays action xi is∑
x−i Q−i(x−i)Mi(xi, x−i); abusing notation again, denote it by Mi(xi, Q−i).
A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is a joint mixed-strategy Q∗ that
is a product distribution formed by the individual players mixed strategies Q∗i
such that, for all players i, and any other alternative mixed strategy Q′i for his
play, Mi(Q
∗
i , Q
∗
−i) ≥Mi(Q′i, Q∗−i). Every game in normal-form has at least one
such equilibrium [Nash, 1951]. Thus, every game has an MSNE “solution.”
One relaxation of MSNE considers the case where the amount of gain each
player can obtain from unilateral deviation is very small. This concept is par-
ticularly useful to study approximation versions of the computational prob-
lem. Given  ≥ 0, an (approximate) -Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is defined
as above, except that the expected gain condition becomes Mi(Q
∗
i , Q
∗
−i) ≥
Mi(Q
′
i, Q
∗
−i)− .
Several refinements and generalizations of MSNE have been proposed. One
of the most interesting generalizations is that of a correlated equilibrium (CE)
[Aumann, 1974]. In contrast to MSNE, a CE can be a full joint distribution,
and thus characterize more complex joint-action behavior by players. Formally,
a correlated equilibrium (CE) is a joint probability distribution Q over A such
that, for all players i, xi, x
′
i ∈ Ai, xi 6= x′i, and Q(xi) > 0,∑
x−i
Q(x−i|xi)Mi(xi, x−i) ≥
∑
x−i
Q(x−i|xi)Mi(x′i, x−i),
where Q(xi) ≡
∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i) is the (marginal) probability that player i will
play xi according to Q and Q(x−i|xi) ≡ Q(xi, x−i)/
∑
x′i
Q(x′i, x−i) is the con-
ditional given xi. An MSNE is CE that is a product distribution. An equiv-
alent expression of the CE condition above is
∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i)Mi(xi, x−i) ≥∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i)Mi(x
′
i, x−i). As was the case for MSNE, we can relax the con-
dition of deviation to account for potential gains from small deviation. Given
 > 0, adding the term “−” to the right-hand-side of the condition above
defines an (approximate) -CE . 8
CE have several conceptual and computational advantages over MSNE. For
instance, all players may achieve better expected payoffs in a CE than those
achievable in any MSNE; 9 some “natural” forms of play are guaranteed to
converge to the (set of) CE [Foster and Vohra, 1997, 1999, Fudenberg and
Levine, 1999, Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, 2003, 2005]; and CE is consistent
with a Bayesian framework [Aumann, 1987], something not yet possible, and
apparently unlikely for MSNE [Hart and Mansour, 2007].
2.2.3 Brief Overview of Results in Computational Game Theory
There has been an explosion of computational results on different equilibrium
concepts on a variety of game representations and settings since the beginning
8Note that approximate CE is usually defined based on this unconditional version of the
CE conditions [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000].
9The distinction between installing a traffic light at an intersection and leaving the inter-
section without one is a real-world example of this.
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of this century. The following is a brief summary. We refer the reader to a book
by Nisan et al. [2007] for a (partial) introduction to this research area.
The problem for two-player zero-sum games, where the sum of the entries
of both matrix is zero, and therefore only one matrix is needed to represent
the game, can be solved in polynomial time: It is equivalent to linear program-
ming [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947, Sze´p and Forgoo´, 1985, Karlin,
1959]. After being open for over 50 years, the problems of the complexity of
computing MSNE in games was finally settled recently, following a very rapid
sequence of results in the last part of 2005 [Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2005,
Daskalakis et al., 2005, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, 2005, Daskalakis et al.,
2009b, Chen and Deng, 2005b]: Computing MSNE is likely to be hard in the
worst case, i.e., PPAD-complete [Papadimitriou, 1994], even in games with only
two players [Chen and Deng, 2005a, 2006, Chen et al., 2009, Daskalakis et al.,
2009a,b]. The result of Fabrikant et al. [2004] suggests that computing PSNE
in succinctly representable games is also likely to be intractable in the worst
case, i.e., PLS-complete [Johnson et al., 1988]. A common statement is that
computing MSNE, and in some cases even PSNE, with “special properties” is
hard in the worst case [Gilboa and Zemel, 1989, Gottlob et al., 2003, Conitzer
and Sandholm, 2008]. Computing approximate MSNE is also thought to be
hard in the worst case [Chen et al., 2006, 2009]. We refer the reader to Ortiz
and Irfan [2017], and the references therein, for recent results along this line
and a brief survey of the state-of-the-art for this problem.
Most current results for computing exact and approximate PSNE or MSNE
in graphical games essentially mirror those for MRFs and constraint networks:
polynomial time for bounded treewidth graph; intractable in general [Kearns
et al., 2001, Gottlob et al., 2003, Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, 2006, Ortiz,
2014]. This is unsurprising because they were mostly inspired by analogous
versions in probabilistic graphical models and constraint networks in AI, and
therefore share similar characteristics. Several heuristics exist for dealing with
general graphs [Vickrey and Koller, 2002, Ortiz and Kearns, 2003, Daskalakis
and Papadimitriou, 2006].
In contrast, there exist polynomial-time algorithms for computing CE, both
for normal-form games (where the problem reduces to a simple linear feasibility
problem) and even most succinctly-representable games known today [Papadim-
itriou, 2005, Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2015a], including graphical games.
3 Equilibria and Inference
The line of work presented in this section is partly motivated by the following
question: Can we leverage advances in computational game theory for problems
in the probabilistic graphical models community? Establishing a strong bilateral
connection between both problems may help us answer this question.
The literature on computing equilibria in games has skyrocketed since the
beginning of this century. As we discover techniques developed early on within
the game theory community, and as new results are generated from the ex-
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tremely active computational game theory community, we may be able to adapt
those techniques for solving games to the inference setting. If we can establish
a strong bilateral connection between inference problems and the computation
of equilibria, we may be able to relate algorithms in both areas and exchange
previously unknown results in each.
3.1 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium and
Approximate MAP Inference
Consider an MRF P with respect to graph G and Gibbs potential Ψ defined
by the set of potential functions {φC}. For each node i, denote by Ci ⊂ C the
subset of cliques in G that include i. Note that the (inclusive) neighborhood of
player i is given by N(i) = ∪C∈CiC.
Define an MRF-induced GMhG, and more specifically, a (hyperedge-symmetric)
hypergraphical game [Papadimitriou, 2005, Ortiz, 2015], with the same graph
G, and for each player i, hypergraph with hyperedges Ci and local-clique payoff
hypermatrices M ′i,C(xC) ≡ φC(xC) for all C ∈ Ci. A few observations about
the game are in order.
Property 1. The representation size of the MRF-induced game is the same as
that of the MRF: not exponential in the largest neighborhood size, but the size
of the largest clique in G.
Property 2. The MRF-induced game is a graphical potential game [Ortiz,
2015] with graph G and (Gibbs) potential function Ψ: i.e., for all i, x and
x′i, Mi(xi, x−i)−Mi(x′i, x−i) = M ′i(xi, xN (i))−M ′i(x′i, xN (i))
=
∑
C∈Ci
φC(xi, xC−{i})−
∑
C∈Ci
φC(x
′
i, xC−{i})
=
∑
C∈Ci
φC(xi, xC−{i}) +
∑
C′∈C−Ci
φC′(xC′)+
−
∑
C∈Ci
φC(x
′
i, xC−{i})−
∑
C′∈C−Ci
φC′(xC′)
=Ψ(xi, x−i)−Ψ(x′i, x−i).
Remark 1. Through the connection established by the last property, it is easy
to see that sequential best-response dynamics is guaranteed to converge to a
PSNE of the game in finite time, regardless of the initial play. 10 In fact, we
can conclude that a joint-action x∗ is a PSNE of the game if and only if x∗ is a
10 Recall that best-response dynamics refers to the a process where at each time step, each
player observes the action x−i of others and takes an action that maximizes its payoff given
that the others played x−i. In this case, those dynamics would essentially be implementing
an axis-parallel coordinate maximization over the space of assignments for the MRF, which
is guaranteed to converge to a local maxima (or critical points) of the MRF.
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local maxima or a critical point of the MRF P . Thus, the MRF-induced game,
like all potential games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996b], always has PSNE. 11
Similarly, for any potential game, one can define a game-induced MRF using
the potential function of the game whose set of local maxima (and critical points)
corresponds exactly to the set of PSNE of the potential game. Through this
connection we can show that solving the local-MAP problem in MRFs is PLS-
complete in general [Fabrikant et al., 2004]. 12
One question that comes to mind is whether one can say anything about the
properties of the globally optimal assignment in the game-induced MRF and the
payoff it supports for the players. Or whether it can be characterized by stronger
notions of equilibria. For example, are strong NE, in which no coalition of players
could obtain a Pareto dominated set of payoffs by unilaterally deviating, joint
MAP assignments of the MFR? Or more generally, what characteristics can we
assign to the MAP assignments of the game-induced MRF?
In short, we can use algorithms for PSNE as heuristics to compute locally
optimal MAP assignments of P and vice versa. 13
Remark 2. Daskalakis et al. [2007] extended results in game theory characteriz-
ing the number of PSNE in normal-form games (see Stanford, 1995, Rinott and
Scarsini, 2000, and the references therein) to graphical games, but now taking
into consideration the network structure of the game. Information about the
number of PSNE in games can provide additional insight on the structure of
MRFs.
For example, one of the results of Daskalakis et al. [2007] states that for
graphs respecting certain expansion properties as the number of nodes/players
increases, the number of PSNE of the graphical game will have a limiting dis-
tribution that is a Poisson with expected value 1. Also according to Daskalakis
et al. [2007], a similar behavior occurs for games with graphs generated ac-
cording to the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model with sufficiently high average-degree (i.e.,
reasonably high connectivity). Thus, either the set of MRF-induced games has
significantly low measure relative to the set of all possible randomly generated
games (something that seems likely), or the number of local maxima (and crit-
ical points) of the MRF will have a similar distribution, and thus that number
11This result should not be surprising given that other researchers have established a one-to-
one relationship between the complexity class PLS [Johnson et al., 1988], which characterizes
local search problems, of which finding local maxima of the MRF is an instance, and (ordinal)
potential games [Fabrikant et al., 2004].
12A direct proof of this result follows from Papadimitriou et al. [1990], and in particular,
the result for Hopfield neural networks [Hopfield, 1982]. A Hopfield neural network can be
seen as an MRF, and more specifically, and Ising model, when the weights on the edges are
symmetric. Similarly, any Hopfield neural network can be seen as a polymatrix game [Miller
and Zucker, 1992]; when the weights are symmetric the network can be seen as a potential game
(in particular, it is an instance of a party affiliation game [Fabrikant et al., 2004]). Indeed,
a stable configuration in an arbitrary Hopfield neural network is equivalent to a PSNE of a
corresponding polymatrix game. (See Papadimitriou et al., 1990, and Miller and Zucker, 1992,
for the relevant references.)
13Note that algorithms for PSNE can in principle find critical points of P . In either case,
algorithms such as the max-product version of belief propagation (BP) can only provide such
local-optimum/critical-point convergence guarantees in general.
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is expected to be low. The latter would suggest that local algorithms such as
the max-product algorithm may be less likely to get stuck in local maxima (or
critical points) of the MRF.
In addition, there have been several results stating that PSNE are unlikely
to exist in many graphs, and that, when they do exist, they are not that
many [Daskalakis et al., 2007]. 14 MRF-induced games would in that sense
represent a very rich class of non-randomly generated graphical games for which
the results above do not hold.
3.2 Mixed-strategy Equilibria and Belief Inference
Going beyond PSNE and MAP estimation, this subsection begins to establish a
stronger, and potentially more useful connection between probabilistic inference
and more general concepts of equilibria in games.
Let S be a subset of the players (i.e., nodes in the graph) and denote by
QS(xS) ≡
∑
xV−S Q(x) the (marginal) probability distribution of Q over possi-
ble joint actions of players in S. Consider the condition for correlated equilibria
(CE), which for the MRF-induced game we can express as, for all i, xi, x
′
i 6= xi,∑
xN(i)
QN(i)(xi, xN (i))
∑
C∈Ci
φC(xi, xC−{i}) ≥∑
xN(i)
QN(i)(xi, xN (i))
∑
C∈Ci
φC(x
′
i, xC−{i}).
Commuting the sums and simplifying we get the following equivalent condition:∑
C∈Ci
∑
xC−{i}
Q(xi, xC−{i})φC(xi, xC−{i}) ≥∑
C∈Ci
∑
xC−{i}
Q(xi, xC−{i})φC(x′i, xC−{i}). (1)
This simplification is important because it highlights that, modulo expected
payoff equivalence, we only need distributions over the original cliques, not the
induced neighbohoods/Markov blankets, to represent CE in this class of games,
in contrast to Kakade et al. [2003]; thus, we are able to maintain the size of the
representation of the CE to be the same as that of the game.
As an alternative, we can use the fact that the MRF-induced game is a
potential game and, via some definitions and algebraic manipulation, get the
following sequence of equivalent conditions, which hold for all i, xi and x
′
i.∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i) (Mi(xi, x−i)−Mi(x′i, x−i)) ≥ 0∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i) (Ψ(xi, x−i)−Ψ(x′i, x−i)) ≥ 0∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i) (lnP (xi, x−i)− lnP (x′i, x−i)) ≥ 0
14In particular, the number of PSNE has a Poisson distribution with parameter 1.
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Rewriting the last expression, we get the following equivalent condition: for all
i, xi and x
′
i,∑
x−i
Q(xi, x−i)[− lnP (xi, x−i)] ≤
∑
x−i Q(xi, x−i)[− lnP (x′i, x−i)] . (2)
The following are some additional remarks on the implications of the last
condition. 15
Remark 3. First, it is useful to introduce the following notation. For any dis-
tribution Q′, let H(Q′, P ) ≡ ∑xQ′(x)[− log2 P (x)] be the cross entropy be-
tween probability distributions Q′ and P , with respect to P . 16 Denote by
Q−i(x−i) ≡
∑
xi
Q(xi, x−i) the marginal distribution of play over the joint-
actions of all players except player i. Denote by Q′iQ−i the joint distribution
defined as (Q′iQ−i)(x) ≡ Q′i(xi)Q−i(x−i) for all x.
Then, condition 2 implies the following sequence of conditions, which hold
for all i.∑
x
Q(x)[− lnP (x)] ≤
∑
x−i
Q−i(x−i)[− lnP (x′i, x−i)] for all x′i
H(Q,P ) ≤ min
x′i
∑
x−i
Q−i(x−i)[− log2 P (x′i, x−i)]
= min
Q′i
∑
x
Q′i(xi)Q−i(x−i)[− log2 P (xi, x−i)]
= min
Q′i
H(Q′iQ−i, P )
As anonymous reviewer pointed out, the condition is actually that of a coarse
CE (CCE) [Hannan, 1957, Moulin and Vial, 1978], which is a superset of CE
and allows us to apply several simple methods for computing such equilibrium
concept, as discussed later in this section. Hence, any CE of the MRF-induced
game is a kind of approximate local optimum (or critical point) of an approxi-
mation of the MRF based on a special type of cross entropy minimization.
The following property summarizes this remark.
Property 3. For any MRF P , any correlated equilibria Q of the game induced
by P satisfies H(Q,P ) ≤ mini minQ′i H(Q′iQ−i, P ).
Remark 4. Let us introduce some additional notation. For any joint distribution
of play Q′, let H(Q′) ≡ ∑xQ′(x)[− log2Q′(x)] be its entropy. Similarly, for
any player i, for any marginal/individual distribution of play Q′i, let H(Q
′
i) ≡∑
xi
Q′i(xi)[− log2Q′i(xi)] be its (marginal) entropy. For any distribution Q′
15In what follows, we refer to concepts from information theory in the discussion, such
as (Shannon’s) entropy, cross entropy, and relative entropy (also known as Kullback-Leibler
divergence). We refer the reader to Cover and Thomas [2006] for a textbook introduction to
those concepts.
16That is, (a lower bound on) the average number of bits required to transmit ”mes-
sages/events” generated according to Q but encoded using a scheme based on P .
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and P , let KL(Q′ ‖ P ) ≡ ∑xQ′(x) log2(Q′(x)/P (x)) = H(Q′, P ) − H(Q′) be
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between Q′ and P , with respect to Q′. Denote
by H(Qi|−i) ≡
∑
xi,x−i Q(xi, x−i) log2(Q(xi, x−i)/Q−i(xi)) = H(Q−i) −H(Q)
the conditional entropy of the individual play of player i given the joint play of
all the players except i, with respect to Q.
Then, we can express the condition 2 as the following equivalent conditions,
which hold for all i.
KL(Q ‖ P ) +H(Q) ≤ min
Q′i
KL(Q′iQ−i ‖ P ) +H(Q′iQ−i)
KL(Q ‖ P ) +H(Qi|−i) ≤ min
Q′i
KL(Q′iQ−i ‖ P ) +H(Q′i)
Hence, any CE of a MRF-induced game is a kind of approximate local optimum
(or critical point) of a special kind of variational approximation of the MRF.
The following property summarizes this remark.
Property 4. For any MRF P , any correlated equilibria Q of the game induced
by P satisfies KL(Q ‖ P ) ≤ mini
[
minQ′i KL(Q
′
iQ−i ‖ P ) +H(Q′i)
]−H(Qi|−i).
Note that the last property implies that the approximation Q satisfies the
local condition KL(Q ‖ P ) ≤ mini minQ′i KL(Q′iQ−i ‖ P ) + log2 |Ωi|.
Before continuing exploring connections to CE, it is instructive to first con-
sider MSNE.
3.2.1 Mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria and
Mean-Field Approximations
In the special case of MSNE, the joint mixed strategy Q(x) =
∏
iQi(xi) is
a product distribution. Denote by Q×−i(x−i) ≡
∏
j 6=iQj(xj) =
∑
xi
Q(x) the
(marginal) joint action of play over all the players except i, and denote by
(Q′iQ
×
−i) the probability distribution defined such that the probability of x is
(Q′iQ
×
−i)(x) ≡ Q′i(xi)Q×−i(x−i).
In this special case, the equilibrium conditions imply the following condi-
tions, which hold for all i: for all xi such that Qi(xi) > 0,∑
x−i
Qi(xi)Q
×
−i(x−i)[− lnP (xi, x−i)]
= min
x′i
∑
x−i
Qi(xi)Q
×
−i(x−i)[− lnP (x′i, x−i)] .
Denoting by X+i ≡ {xi ∈ Ai | Qi(xi) > 0}, the last condition implies that∑
xi∈X+i
∑
x−i
Qi(xi)Q
×
−i(x−i)[− lnP (xi, x−i)] = ∑
xi∈X+i
Qi(xi)
min
x′i
∑
x−i
Q×−i(x−i)[− lnP (x′i, x−i)] .
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The last condition is equivalent to∑
xi
∑
x−i
Qi(xi)Q
×
−i(x−i)[− lnP (xi, x−i)]
= min
x′i
∑
x−i
Q×−i(x−i)[− lnP (x′i, x−i)] ,
which, in turn, we can express as H(Q,P ) = minQ′i H(Q
′Q×, P ) . The last
expression is also equivalent to
KL(Q ‖ P ) +H(Qi) = min
Q′i
KL(Q′iQ
×
−i ‖ P ) +H(Q′i) .
Hence, a NE Q of the game is almost a locally optimal mean-field approximation,
except for the extra entropic term. In summary, for MSNE we have the following
tighter condition than for arbitrary CE.
Property 5. For any MRF P , any MSNE Q of the game induced by P satisfies
KL(Q ‖ P ) = [minQ′i KL(Q′iQ×−i ‖ P ) +H(Q′i)]−H(Qi), for all i.
Note that the last property implies that the mean-field approximation Q
satisfies the local condition KL(Q ‖ P ) ≤ minQ′i KL(Q′iQ×−i ‖ P ) + log2 |Ωi| for
all i.
One possible way to address the issue of the extra entropic term is to consider
instead the MRF-induced infinite game, where each player i has the (continuous)
utility function 17
M˜ ′i(Qi, QN (i)) ≡
∑
xi
∑
xN(i)
Qi(xi) ∏
j∈N (i)
Qj(xj)
M ′i(xi, xN (i)) +H(Qi)
and wants to maximize over its mixed-strategy Qi given the other player mixed-
strategies Qj for all j 6= i.
Property 6. The MRF-induced infinite game defined above is an infinite Gibbs
potential game with the same graph G and the following potential over the set
of individual (product) mixed strategies
Ψ(Q) =
∑
C∈C
∑
xC
∏
j∈C
Qj(xj)
φC(xC) +H(Q)
=−KL(Q ‖ P ) + Z
17In an infinite game the sets of actions or pure strategies are uncountable. Existence of
equilibria holds under reasonable conditions (i.e., each set of actions is a nonempty compact
convex subset of Euclidean space, and each player utility is continuous and quasi-concave in
the player’s action), all of which are satisfied by the MRF-induced infinite game considered
here. (See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, for more information.)
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where Z is the normalizing constant for P . From this we can derive that the
individual player mixed-strategies {Qi} are a “pure strategy” equilibrium of the
infinite game if and only if
KL(Q ‖ P ) = minQ′i KL(Q′iQ×−i ‖ P ).
Or, in other words, if Q is a PSNE of the infinite game, then Q is also a
local optimum (or critical point) of the mean-field approximation of P .
Remark 5. The local payoff function defined above for the infinite game also
has connections to the game theory literature on learning in games [Fudenberg
and Levine, 1999]. This area studies properties of processes by which players
“learn” how to play in (usually repeated) games; especially properties related to
the existence of convergence of the learning (or playing) dynamics to equilibria.
In particular, the local payoff function is similar to that used by logistic fictitious
play, a special version of a “learning” process called smooth fictitious play. The
difference is that the last entropy term involving the individual player’s mixed
strategy has a regularization-type factor λ > 0 such that players play strict
best-response as λ → 0. In addition, logistic fictitious play is an instance of
a learning process that, if followed by a player, achieves so called approximate
universal consistency (i.e., roughly, in the limit of infinite play, the average of
the payoffs obtained by the player will be close to the best obtained overall
during repeated play, regardless of how the other players behave), also known as
Hannan consistency [Hannan, 1957], for appropriate values of λ depending on
the desired approximation level.
Indeed, it is not hard to see that in fact the best-response mixed-strategy
Qi of player i to the mixed strategies QN (i) of their neighbors is Qi(xi) ∝
exp
(∑
xN(i)
[∏
j∈N (i)Qj(xj)
]
M ′i(xi, xN (i))
)
=
exp
 ∑
C∈Ci,C 6={i}
 ∏
j∈C−{i}
Qj(xj)
φC(xi, xC−{i})
 .
Hence, running sequential best-response dynamics in the MRF-induced infinite
game is equivalent to finding a variational mean-field approximation via recur-
sive updating of the first derivative conditions. 18 The process will then be
equivalent to minimizing the function F (Q) ≡ KL(Q ‖ P ) by axis-parallel up-
dates. The resulting sequence of distributions/mixed-strategies monotonically
decreases the value of F and is guaranteed to converge to a local optimum or
a critical point of F . Hence, the corresponding learning process is guaranteed
to converge to a PSNE of the infinite game, which is in turn an approximate
MSNE of the original game. But this is not surprising in retrospect, given the
last property (Property 6). That property essentially states a broader property
of all potential games: they are isomorphic to so called games with identical
18In particular, the process is called a Cournot adjustment with lock-in in the literature on
learning in games [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999].
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interests [Monderer and Shapley, 1996b], which are games where every player
has exactly the same payoff function.
Remark 6. The previous discussion suggests that we could use appropriately-
modified versions of algorithms for MSNE, such as NashProp [Ortiz and Kearns,
2003], as heuristics to obtain a mean-field approximation of the true marginals.
Going in the opposite direction, the discussion above also suggests that, by
treating any (graphical) potential game as an MRF, for any fixed λ > 0, logistic
fictitious play in any potential game converges to an approximate (λ/mini |Ai|)-
MSNE of the potential game. Indeed, there has been recent work in this direc-
tion, which explores the connection between learning in games and mean-field
approximations in machine learning [Rezek et al., 2008]. That work proposes
new algorithms based on fictitious play for simple mean-field approximation
applied to statistical (Bayesian) estimation.
The game-induced MRF is a λ-temperature Gibbs measure. As we take
λ→ 0, we get the limiting 0-temperature Gibbs measure which is a probability
distribution over the set of global maxima of the potential function of the game,
and 0 probability everywhere (i.e., the support of the limiting distribution is
the set of joint-actions that maximize the potential function). The support of
the 0-temperature Gibbs measure is a subset of the “globally optimal” PSNE of
the potential game. But there might be other equilibria corresponding to local
optima (or critical points) of the potential function.
Are there other connections between the Nash equilibria of the game and
the support of the limiting distribution?
3.2.2 Correlated Equilibria and
Higher-order Variational Approximations
Kakade et al. [2003] designed polynomial-time algorithms based on linear pro-
gramming for computing CE in standard graphical games with tree graphs. The
approach and polynomial-time results extend to graphical games with bounded-
tree-width graphs and graphical polymatrix games with tree graphs. Ortiz et al.
[2007] (see also Ortiz et al., 2006) proposed the principle of maximum entropy
(MaxEnt) for equilibrium selection of CE in graphical games. They studied
several properties of the MaxEnt CE, designed a monotonically increasing algo-
rithm to compute it, and discussed a learning-dynamics view of the algorithm.
Kamisetty et al. [2011] employed advances in approximate inference methods
to propose approximation algorithms to compute CE. In all of those cases, the
general approach is to use ideas from probabilistic graphical models to design
algorithms to compute CE. The focus of this paper is the opposite direction:
employing ideas from game theory to design algorithms for belief inference in
probabilistic graphical models.
Property 4 suggests that we can use the CE for the MRF-induced game as a
heuristic approximation to higher-order variational approximations. In fact, one
would argue that in the context of inference, doing so is more desirable because,
in principle, it can lead to better approximations that can capture more aspects
of the joint distribution than a simple mean-field approximation would alone.
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For example, mean-field approximations are likely to be poor if the MRF is
multi-modal. Motivated by this fact, Jaakkola and Jordan [1997] suggest using
mixture of product distributions to improve the simple variational mean-field
approximation.
3.2.3 Some Computational Implications
But, consider the algorithms of Papadimitriou [2005] or Jiang and Leyton-Brown
[2015a] (see also Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008, and Jiang and Leyton-
Brown, 2011), which we can use to compute a CE of the MRF-induced game in
polynomial time. Such CE will be, by construction, also a (polynomially-sized)
mixture of product distributions. (In the case of Jiang and Leyton-Brown’s al-
gorithm it will be a mixture of a subset of the joint-action space, which is
equivalent to a probability mass function over a polynomially-sized subset of
the joint-action space; said differently, a mixture of product of indicator func-
tions, each product corresponding to particular outcomes of the joint-action
space.) Hence, the algorithms of Papadimitriou and Jiang and Leyton-Brown
both provide a means to obtain a heuristic estimate of a local optimum (or
critical point) of such a mixture in polynomial time. The result would not be
exactly the same as that obtained by Jaakkola and Jordan [1997] in general,
because of the extra entropic term mentioned in the discussion earlier. Can we
find alternative versions of the payoff matrices, and/or alter Papadimitriou’s
algorithm, so that the resulting correlated equilibria provides an exact answer to
the approximate inference problem that uses mixtures of product distributions?
Regardless, at the very least one could use the resulting CE to initialize the
technique of Jaakkola and Jordan [1997] without specifying an a priori number
of mixtures.
Having said that, both Papadimitriou’s and Jiang and Leyton-Brown’s al-
gorithms make a polynomial number of calls to the ellipsoid-algorithm, or more
specifically, its “oracle,” to obtain each of the product distributions whose
mixture will form the output CE. It is known that the ellipsoid algorithm is
slow in practice. Papadimitriou [2005], Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008],
and Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2015a] leave open the design of more practical
algorithms based on interior-point methods.
Finally, this connection also suggests that we can (in principle) use any
learning algorithm that guarantees convergence to the set of CE (as described
in the section on preliminaries on game theory where the concept was intro-
duced) as a heuristic for approximate inference. Several so-called “no-regret”
learning algorithms satisfy those conditions. Indeed, we use two simple vari-
ants of such algorithms in our experiments. Viewed that way, such learning
algorithms would be similar in spirit to stochastic simulation algorithms with
a kind of “adaptivity” reminiscent of the work on adaptive importance sam-
pling (see, e.g., Cheng and Druzdzel, 2000, Ortiz and Kaelbling, 2000, Ortiz,
2002, and the references therein). Establishing a possible stronger connection
between learning in games, CE, and probabilistic inference seems like a promis-
ing direction for future research. In fact, as previously mentioned (at the end
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of Remark 5), there has already been some recent work in this direction, but
specifically for MSNE and mean-field approximations [Rezek et al., 2008].
Later in this paper, we present the results of an experimental evaluation
of the performance of a simple no-regret learning algorithm in computational
game theory [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999, Blum and Mansour, 2007, Hart and
Mas-Colell, 2000] in the context of probabilistic inference. Those are iterative al-
gorithms like many other approximate inference methods such as mean field and
other variational approximations, but closer in spirit to sampling/simulation-
based methods such as the Gibbs sampler and other similar MCMC methods.
Indeed, the running time per iteration of those algorithms is roughly the same
as that of sampling-based methods. We delay the details until the Experiments
section (Section 4).
3.3 Other Previous and Related Work
Earlier work on the so called “relaxation labeling” problem in AI and computer
vision [Rosenfeld et al., 1976, Miller and Zucker, 1991] has established connec-
tions to polymatrix games [Janovskaja, 1968] (see also Hummel and Zucker,
1983, although the connection had yet to be recognized at that time). That
work also establishes connections to inference in Hopfield networks, dynamical
systems, and polymatrix games [Miller and Zucker, 1991, Zucker, 2001]. A re-
duction of MAP to PSNE in what we call here a GMhG was introduced by
Yu and Berthod [1995] in the same context (see also Berthod et al., 1996);
although they concentrate on pairwise potentials, which reduce to polymatrix
games in this context. Because, in addition, the ultimate goal in MAP inference
is to obtain a global optimum configuration, Yu and Berthod [1995] proposed a
Metropolis-Hastings-style algorithm in an attempt to avoid local minima. Their
algorithm is similar to simulated annealing algorithms used for solving satisfi-
ability problems, and other local methods such as WalkSAT [Selman et al.,
1996] (see, e.g., Russell and Norvig, 2003 for more information). The algorithm
can also be seen as a kind of learning-in-games scheme [Fudenberg and Levine,
1999] based on best-response with random exploration (or “trembling hand”
best response). That is, at every round, some best-response is taken with some
probability, otherwise the previous response is replayed. Zucker [2001] presents
a modern account of that work. The connection to potential games, and all its
well-known properties (e.g., convergence of best-response dynamics) does not
seem to have been recognized within that literature. Also, none of the work
makes connections to higher-order (i.e., beyond mean-field) inference approxi-
mation techniques or the game-theoretic notion of CE.
3.4 Approximate Fictitious Play in a Two-player
Potential Game for Belief Inference in Ising Models
This section presents a game-theoretic fictitious-play approach to estimation of
node-marginal probabilities in MRFs. The approach this time is more global in
terms of how we use the whole joint-distribution for the estimation of individual
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marginal probabilities. The inspiration for the approach presented here follows
from the work of Wainwright et al. [2005]. The section concentrates on Ising
models, an important, special MRF instance from statistical physics with its
own interesting history.
Definition 2. An Ising model wrt an undirected graph G = (V,E) is an MRF
wrt G such that
Pθ(x) ∝ exp
∑
i∈V
bixi +
∑
(i,j)∈E
wi,jxixj

where θ ≡ (,
¯
W) is the set of node biases bi’s and edge-weights wij ’s, which are
the parameters defining the joint distribution Pθ over {−1,+1}n.
It is fair to say that interest on more general classes of MRFs originates
from the special class of Ising models. It is also fair to say that, because of the
relative simplicity and importance of Ising models for problems in statistical
physics, as well as to other ML and AI applications areas such as computer vi-
sion and NLP, Ising models have become the most common platforms in which
to empirically study approximation algorithms for arbitrary MRFs. In short,
simplicity of presentation and empirical evaluation guide the focus of Ising mod-
els in this section: Generalizations to arbitrary MRFs are straightforward but
cumbersome to present. Hence, in this manuscript, we omit the details of such
generalizations.
As an outline, the current section begins with an algorithmic instantiation
of the iterative approach. The exact instantiation depends on whether we are
using CE or MSNE as the solution concept. The section then follows with an
informal discussion of the game-theoretic foundations of the general framework
behind the approach, and a discussion of immediate implications to computa-
tional properties and potential convergence.
Denote by TG the set of all spanning trees of connected (undirected) graph
G = (V,E) that are maximal with respect to E (i.e., does not contain any
spanning forests). If spanning tree T ∈ TG, we denote by E(T ) ⊂ E the set of
edges of T . To simplify the presentation of the algorithm, let
M˜T (µ, T ) ≡
∑
(i,j)∈E
1[(i, j) ∈ E(T )]wijµ(i,j)
and
ΨX,T (x, T ) ≡
∑
i∈V
bixi +
∑
(i,j)∈E
1[(i, j) ∈ E(T )]wijxixj .
Initialize x(1) ← Uniform({−1,+1}n), and for each (i, j) ∈ E, µ̂(1)(i,j) ←
x
(1)
i x
(1)
j . At each iteration l = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
1: T(l) ← arg maxT∈TG M˜T (µ̂(l)(i,j), T )
2: T (l) ← Uniform (arg maxT∈TG T(l))
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3: sl ← Uniform({1, . . . , l})
4: X (l+1) ← arg maxx∈{−1,+1}n ΨX,T (x, T (sl))
5: x(l+1) ← Uniform (X (l+1))
6: for all (i, j) ∈ E do
7: v
(l+1)
(i,j) ← x(l+1)i x(l+1)j ×
{
1, if MSNE,
1
[
(i, j) ∈ E(T (sl))], if CE
8: µ̂
(l+1)
(i,j) ←
l µ̂
(l)
(i,j)
+v
(l+1)
(i,j)
l+1
9: end for
For each Ising-model’s random-variable index i = 1, . . . , n, set
p
(m+1)
i =
1
m+ 1
m+1∑
l=1
1
[
x
(l)
i = 1
]
as the estimate of the exact Ising-model’s marginal probability pi ≡ P(Xi = 1).
The running time of the algorithm is dominated by the computation of the
maximum spanning tree (Step 1) which is O(|E|+n log n). All other steps take
O(|E|).
Within the literature on probabilisitic graphical models, Hamze and de Fre-
itas [2004] propose an MCMC approach based on sampling non-overlapping
trees. While our approach has a sampling flavor, its exact connection to MCMC
is unclear at best. Also, the spanning trees that our algorithm generates may
overlap.
The following discussion connects the algorithm above to an approximate
version of fictitious play from the literature on learning in games in game theory.
For the most part, we omit discussions to approximate variational inference in
this manuscript, except to say that TRW message-passing [Wainwright et al.,
2005] is the inspiration behind our proposed algorithm above.
The game implicit in the heuristic algorithm above is a two-player potential
game between a “joint-assignment” (JA) player and a “spanning-tree” (ST)
player. The potential function is ΨX,T (x, T ). The payoff functions MX and MT
of the JA player and the ST player, respectively, are identical and equal the
potential function ΨX,T (x, T ): formally, MX(x, T ) = MT (x, T ) = ΨX,T (x, T ).
Note that the payoff function of the ST player is strategically equivalent to the
function
∑
(i,j)∈E 1[(i, j) ∈ E(T )]wijxixj .
Technically, this is a game with identical payoffs, which are known to have
what Monderer and Shapley [1996a] called the fictitious play property : the em-
pirical play of fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to an MSNE of the game.
While determining a best-response for the ST player is easy (i.e., using an al-
gorithm for computing maximal spanning tree such as Kruskal’s, as we do in
our implementation for the experiments), unfortunately the same is in general
not possible for the JA player, whose best-response is as hard as computing a
MAP assignment of another Ising model with the same graph and (generally
non-zero) biasnode parameters, but a slightly different set of edge-weights. 19
19As mentioned earlier, there are some instances for which this computation is actually
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One approach to deal with the problem of obtaining a best-response from
the JA player is to draw one tree uniformly at random from the empirical dis-
tribution and find a best-response to that tree. Such an approach is equivalent
to a type of smooth best-response. If both players were to do the same, si-
multaneously, the result is a stochastic version of fictitious play or stochastic
fictitious play for short [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999]. The empirical distri-
bution of play of stochastic fictitious play in a game with identical payoffs, or
what’s strategically equivalent, any potential game, also converges to an MSNE
of the game [Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002]. In our case, however, we really
have a type of “hybrid” sequential-version, where the ST player is always be-
having as in standard fictitious play, while the JA player is behaving according
to a stochastic fictitious play.
In addition, as an alternative to the best-response computation for player JA,
we might want to add an entropic (preference) function of the mixed-strategy
to the JA player as an additional term in JA’s payoff, so that the result is really
a “smooth” best-response, or more specifically in this case a smooth stochastic
fictitious play [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999]. Such an addition would make
the connection to variational inference more evident, and would allow us to
develop more direct bounds on the quality of the variational result. The main
problem is that we do not know of any study of such hybrids within game
theory. In addition, most instances of fictitious play assume simultaneous moves.
Numerical instability is another problem we found in practice when using such
smooth best-response. Even in instances where that was not a problem, the
performance was indistinguishable, in a formal statistical sense, from the version
of the algorithm that we propose above.
In the context of belief inference, we believe it actually makes more sense
to have a so called “sequential” play, where players trade moves: the JA player
starts by choosing some action (i.e., full, joint assignments to the random vari-
ables), the ST player best-responds to that action, then the JA player best-
responds to the ST player’s action, continuing in that way, such that at each
round, each player is best-responding to the empirical distribution of play 20
up to the time the player makes a move (i.e., draws an action). While this
type of sequential process often helps to stabilize the dynamics and improve the
likelihood of convergence, it seems that such sequential processes have received
considerably less attention than their simultaneous-move counterpart within the
game-theory community.
We conjecture, however, that the type of fictitious play process defined above
in fact converges. We believe that the proof follows from combining results
possible in polynomial time. In fact, this would have been possible for the type of Ising
models with planar two-dimensional grid graph, also known as a “square lattices,” we used in
the experiments, if we would have chosen those models to have zero biases, or the edge-weights
had some special characteristics. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the specific Ising
models randomly drawn would satisfy those conditions in general. As we discuss shortly,
we settle for a simple computation of the best-response for the JA player using stochastic
fictitious play [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999].
20In game theory, this is also known as the belief distribution of play each player has about
the others’ future mixed-strategy based on previously observed play.
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from standard and stochastic fictitious play for games with identical payoffs,
which are (strategically equivalent) instances of potential games [Monderer and
Shapley, 1996a, Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002]. The derivation is complex and
not trivial, involving key mathematical concepts from the literature in stochastic
approximation. Delving into such level of complexity not only goes beyond the
scope of this paper, but more importantly, doing so distracts attention from the
paper’s main focus: to provide a general, broad illustration of how ideas and
results from game theory may be useful in providing alternative, effective, and
practical approaches to hard belief-inference problems in probabilistic graphical
models. Thus, we leave the formal proof of our conjecture as future work.
As a last point, it is important to understand and keep in mind that, as
it is well-known, in the context of potential games, while sequential best-reply
converges to a PSNE (i.e., a joint assignment), fictitious play can converge to an
MSNE of the game. 21 Monderer and Shapley [1996a] provide an example in a
2-player 2-action normal-form (coordination) game with identical payoffs. Said
differently, the resulting empirical distribution of play for the JA player may be
to what Monderer and Shapley [1996a] themselves call a “purely mixed strat-
egy” (i.e, every action is played with positive probability; or said differently, the
corresponding probability mass function has full suport over the action set of
the player). 22 In the context of belief inference, the resulting mixed-strategy
would correspond to an (approximate) marginal distribution, not a particular
joint-assignment. Hence, in the context of belief inference, the convergence of
the procedure above may not have to be to a single (possibly local) optimum
of the potential function ΨX,T : in principle, convergence could be to a (non-
deterministic) mixture over joint-assignments. In fact, this is what we observe
in our experiments, albeit after only a finite number of iterations. A thorough
understanding of the convergence properties observed in practice requires con-
siderably more experimental work than is reasonable within the context and
purpose of the work described in this manuscript.
3.5 Sketch of algorithm derivation and relation to TRW
The connection between TRW and the algorithm presented in this section re-
sults from a stochastic minimization of a precise upper bound on a variational
approximation that uses a joint distribution (CE) or a product distributions
(MSNE) over the spanning trees of the MRF graph G = (V,E) and the original
MRF’s random variables X. Here is a sketch of the precise mathematical ex-
pressions for the CE-based case. (The ones for the MSNE-case are very similar,
and omitted for brevity.) While the derivation is more general, we only present
it in the context of Ising models.
We use the following notation for the purpose of the discussion here. Let
21Recall that in fictitious play, each player uses the empirical distribution of play as an
estimate or belief of how the other player would behave in the future, not just the other
player’s last action as in sequential best-reply.
22Other names used in game theory are totally mixed strategy or mixed strategy with full
support.
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QX,T be the variational joint distribution over the random variables X and T
corresponding to joint variable assignments and spanning tree, respectively. Let
QX be the marginal probability ofQX,T overX: i.e., QX(x) ≡
∑
T∈TG QX,T (x, T ),
for all x ∈ {−1,+1}. Let PX ≡ Pθ be the ground-truth joint distribution (defin-
ing the Ising model) we would like to approximate. Denote by
KL(QX ||PX) ≡
∑
x
QX(x) ln
QX(x)
PX(x)
the KL-divergence of between QX and PX with respect to QX . Let Q̂X,T the
empirical joint distribution of ”joint actions” for the both players generated
during fictitious play: i.e., Q̂X,T (x, T ) ≡ 1m
∑m
l=1 1
[
x(l) = x, T (l) = T
]
. Let
vij ≡ EQ̂X,T [XiXj ] =
∑
x Q̂X(x)xixj , where Q̂X(x) ≡
∑
T∈TG Q̂X,T (x, T ) de-
notes the empirical marginal over X only; that is, summed over all spanning
trees T over G = (V,E) with respect to Q̂, which is clearly easy to compute:
Q̂X(x) ≡
∑
T∈TG Q̂X,T (x, T ) for all x. Let
uij ≡EQ∗X,T [1[(i, j) 6∈ T ]XiXj ]
=
∑
x,T Q
∗
X,T (x, T )1[(i, j) 6∈ T ]xixj .
where Q∗X,T ∈ arg maxQX,T
∑
x,T QX,T (x, T )Ψ(x, T ). Denote by H(Q
∗
X) ≡
−∑xQ∗X(x) lnQ∗X(x) the standard ”Shannon’s entropy” of X with respect to
the marginal of Q∗X,T over X (i.e., Q
∗
X(x) =
∑
T Q
∗
X,T (x, T )); and similarly
for H(Q̂X). After some algebra, we can obtain the following bound for the
variational approximation:
min
QX
KL(QX ||PX) ≤− max
QX,T
∑
x,T
QX,T (x, T )Ψ(x, T )+
−
∑
(i,j)∈E
wijuij −H(Q∗X) + lnZ .
The first term in the bound, maximizing over QX,T , inspires the application of
fictitious play. As an aside, note that we can generate a family of upper bounds
(details omitted); e,g,, for Q̂X ,
min
QX
KL(QX ||PX) ≤−
∑
(i,j)∈E
wijvij −H(Q̂X) + lnZ .
Note that H(Q̂X) is easy to compute, and that the last expression leads imme-
diately to an easily computable lower bound on lnZ.
4 Experiments
In this section we present the results of synthetic experiments on the perfor-
mance of the game-theoretic-inspired heuristics we propose in this paper for
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approximate belief inference in MRFs. Our algorithms have very simple im-
plementations. We also compare them with the most popular approximation
algorithms and heuristics, with equally simple implementations, proposed in the
literature on probabilistic graphical models.
4.1 Experimental Design: Synthetic Models
The experimental design in terms of the class of Ising models is as in Domke
and Liu [2013]. We consider Ising models with d× d simple grid graphs, which
are planar (i.e., no “wrap around” edges, such that each of the four corner
nodes have exactly two neighboring nodes, any other non-internal node has
exactly three neighbors, while the rest, i.e., all internal nodes, have exactly
four neighbors). Hence, the number of variables or nodes is n = d2. We used
d ∈ {8, 12} for our experiments. We did not consider edge-weights magnitude
parameters 1.0 or 1.5, because it is really hard to beat a Gibbs sampler for
maximum weight magnitudes smaller than 2.0, relative to the bias parameters
bi’s being in the real-valued interval [−1, 1]. The reason for this might be that,
because, as stated in Domke and Liu [2013], the mixing rate of a Gibbs sampler
in such models grows roughly exponential with the magnitude, the induced
Markov chain mixes pretty fast for such cases; thus convergence is quick. For
each value w ∈ {2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0}, we generated random Ising models with
edge-weights wij ∼ Uniform([−w,w]) or wij ∼ Uniform([0, w]) for the “mixed”
or “attractive” case, respectively, for each (i, j) ∈ E, i.i.d., and node biases
bi ∼ Uniform([−1,+1]), also i.i.d. for all i, and independent of the edge-weights.
One exception on the class of Ising models used for evaluation is a class we
use with edge-weights with constant magnitude (i.e., w = max(i,j)∈E |wij |), but
in which we vary the probability q of attractive edge-weights; that is, given a
probability q, the sign of the edge-weight are i.i.d. random variables in which
the sign is positive with probability q, and negative with probability 1 − q. 23
We propose this class of Ising models for future evaluations of approximate
belief inference techniques. For evaluation using this class, we consider w ∈
{2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0}. For each q, we randomly generated 50 Ising models as samples
for w = 4, and 5 samples for each w 6= 4.
Note that despite the graphs being planar, the bias parameter is non-zero in
general, so that the known polynomial-time exact algorithms for planar graphs
do not technically apply.
Here, we consider simple no-regret algorithms from the literature of learning
in games [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999, Blum and Mansour, 2007]. The two
most common notions of regret are external and swap regret, the latter being
stronger than the former. (Another name often used for external regret is “un-
conditional regret,” while other names for swap regret are “internal regret” and
“conditional regret.” We refer the reader to the references to standard literature
on learning in games for specific definitions.) There are several such no-regret
23The weight of each edge (i, j) ∈ E is a random variable of the form Wij = (2Sij − 1)w,
where the Sij ∼ Bernoulli(q), i.i.d., and w is a positive constant.
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algorithms in the literature with different types of convergence guarantees de-
pending on the exact notion of regret used. Here we consider two types of
no-regret algorithms, and leave the evaluation of other no-regret algorithms for
future work. One type of algorithm we consider is really a class of algorithms
based on the Multiplicative Weight Update (MWU) algorithm [Blum and Man-
sour, 2007]. In our implementation of the MWU algorithm, for each player i at
each round t ≥ 1, we set the probability of playing action xi at round t + 1,
which we denote by x
(t+1)
i , to be pt+1(xi) ∝ pt(xi)
(
1− ηt(1− M¯i(xi, x(t)−i))
)
,
where ηt is analogous to a learning rate in ML (i.e., the step size when using
standard gradient descent/ascend for optimization), and M¯i is the normalized
payoff function for player i (i.e., the expression xi
(∑
(i,j)∈E wi,jxj + bi
)
nor-
malized so that minimum and maximum values are 0 and 1, respectively). In
general, if we set the value of ηt to a constant η we guarantee that the em-
pirical joint distribution over joint actions induced by the played sequence of
joint actions x(t) converges to the set of approximate CCE, where the level of
the approximation depend on η. If we set ηt =
√
ln(2)
t then we guarantee that
convergence to the set of CCE. 24 There is a simple construction that allows us
to use the MWU algorithm to construct algorithms for which a player can have
either no swap regret, or approximately swap-regret, depending on the value of
ηt: if constant (η) the empirical distribution of empirical play converges to the
set of approximate CE, while if set as above convergence is guaranteed to the
set of CE. 25 We refer to the different versions of no-regret algorithms based
on MWU related to convergence to exact or approximate CCE as “mw er” and
“mw er cf,” respectively; and to those related to exact or approximate CE as
“mw sr” and “mw sr cf,” respectively. We set η to 0.01 in all of our experiments.
We also evaluate a simple (approximate) no-swap-regret algorithm by Hart
and Mas-Colell [2000], which we denote as “nr” from now on. Like all (ap-
proximate) no-swap-regret algorithms, nr guarantees to converge to (the set of
approximate) CE. Each iteration of nr takes roughly the same amount of time
as that for Gibbs sampling. We set the number of iterations of the nr algorithm
to 105 for the standard experimental setup, and to 106 for our proposed new
evaluation setting. Our exact implementation is a natural adaptation we be-
lieve is more amenable to the belief-inference setting. In particular, we evaluate
a version in which we update the mixed-strategy each player uses to draw an
action at every iteration t as follows. For each player, (1) we set the probability
of switching the player’s last action being equal to the empirical regret, or 0
if the empirical regret is negative; and (2) we set the player’s probability of
playing action +1 by “damping” the currently suggested probability of playing
24The set of CCE is a superset of CE and is related to the concept of external regret. Indeed,
convergence to the set of CCE implies that each player has no external regret, and we say
that the empirical play of the player is “Hannan consistent” [Hannan, 1957], or equivalently,
“universally consistent” [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999].
25The set of CE is related to the concept of swap regret. Indeed, convergence to the set of
CE implies that each player has no swap regret.
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+1, pt(1), for the corresponding player by the original algorithm:
26 that is, we
use the update 0.99 × pt(1) + 0.01 × (0.5). We also use 105 iterations. Also,
we only present results for the sequential, “semi-stochastic” fictitious play we
discuss in Section 3.4, for the case of CE only, which we denote as “fp (ce)”
from now on. We set the number of iterations m = 15. 27 Finally, the results
for the MSNE-instantiation of the fictitious play algorithm we propose are quite
similar to those for fp (ce), at least for m = 15; thus, we omit those results in
the interest of keeping the plots less “crowded” and thus easier to interpret.
We compare the different mw-type algorithms, the simple nr algorithm, and
our proposed fp (ce) to (1) standard mean-field approximation (mf), with se-
quentialaxis-parallel updates; (2) standard belief propagation (bp), with simul-
taneous updates; (3) TRW (trw); and (4) the Gibbs sampler (gs). The running
times per iteration of all methods is O(|E|), except that of fp (ce) which is
O(|E| + n log n), and of course that of bl which is constant. In the next para-
graph, we provide more detail on the specifics of the implementations of methods
(1–4).
As baseline (bl), we use the simplest possible estimator from the perspective
of average marginal-error to measure quality: always use 0.5 as the estimate
of the exact marginal distribution of each variable. Certainly, one would ex-
pect that for an algorithm to be competitive, its performance should be better
than bl. As we soon discuss, our experimental results suggest that this is not
always the case; that is, several standard methods, including some of the ones
proposed here and even state-of-the-art such as TRW, do not satisfy that condi-
tion for “hard” cases. We evaluate mean field (mf) using sequentialaxis-parallel
updates, stopping if the maximum absolute difference in probability values be-
tween iterations is ≤ 10−5, and using a maximum number of iterations = 106.
For belief propagation (bp) we use simultaneous updates, and “smooth” the
update based on the average of the current value and the new value in order to
“dampen” or at least try to prevent oscillations and improve the likelihood of
convergence, 28 stopping if the maximum absolute difference in probability val-
ues between iterations is ≤ 10−7, and a maximum number of iterations = 105.
For tree reweighed message-passing (trw), we use a constant parameter ρ = 0.55
for all corresponding edge-appearance-probability parameters ρij ’s [Wainwright
26The algorithm determines its suggested probability solely on the positively-truncated
empirical regret.
27That number of iterations is relatively low, but given that our implementation is in MAT-
LAB, setting m = 15 is roughly the number of iterations for which the amount is roughly the
same as that for our C implementation of TRW, as described in Wainwright et al. [2005], but
without optimizing for the parameters ρij ’s, which we set to a constant = 0.55 for all edges
(i, j) ∈ E. Clearly this is an unfair comparison for fp (ce). The optimization of ρij ’s involves
performing a maximum spanning tree computation at each iteration until convergence, and
this operation follows each TRW message-passing with fixed ρij ’s. While such an optimiza-
tion is tractable, and optimizing for the ρij ’s does seem to improve the upper-bounds on the
log-partition function, it is not clear from the experimental results in Wainwright et al. [2005]
that the improvement on the quality of the individual marginal estimates justify the extra
work necessary for the optimization.
28It is well known that bp may not converge in MRFs with loopy graph, such as the Ising
model with grid graph we are using here for our experiments.
28
et al., 2005], along with a smooth update and the same stopping criterion as for
bp. For the Gibbs sampler, we use 106 iterations.
4.2 Experimental Results: Synthetic Models
Fig. 1 summarizes our results for the most common classes of Ising models con-
sidered in the experimental evaluation of approximation algorithms and heuris-
tic for belief inference in the literature as described above. We perform hypoth-
esis testing for the result in these classes of Ising models using paired z-tests
on the individual (i.e., not joint) differences, each with p-value 0.05. Hence,
all the statements are statistically significant with respect to such hypothesis
tests. Note that there is no globally best approximation technique overall for
these classes. Finally, plots for both 8x8 and 12x12 models are included to illus-
trate how the relative performance of these approximation algorithms are not
strongly affected by the grid size d. For brevity, we will only discuss results for
the 12x12 case. We refer the reader to Appendix A for experimental results and
discussion for the 8x8 case.
Among all mw-type algorithms, we only present the results of mw er cf be-
cause it outperforms all other types almost consistently, as we discuss later in
this section and plot in Fig. 5. Hence, we refer to mw er cf simply as ’mw’ from
now on.
“Mixed” 12x12 case (Bottom left plot, Fig. 1). Clearly, gs is best for
all w in this case. Among the other approximation algorithms, we observe the
following.
1. fp (ce) is worse than bp for w < 3.5, and indistinguishable from bp for
w ≥ 3.5.
2. fp (ce) is consistently better than trw.
3. trw is consistently worse than bp.
4. mw is worse than fp (ce) for w < 3.0, and indistinguishable from fp (ce)
for w ≥ 3.0
5. All methods, except for mf and nr, are consistently better than bl. mf and
nr are consistently worse than bl.
6. mf is better than nr for w ≥ 3.0, and indistinguishable from each other
for w < 3.0.
“Attractive” 12x12 case (Bottom right plot, Fig. 1). In this case, there
is no clear overall best. We also observe the following.
1. trw is best among all methods for w ≥ 3.0, indistinguishable from gs for
w = 2.5, and worse than gs for w = 2.0.
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2. fp (ce) is worse than gs for w = 2.0, but better than gs for w = 4.0, and
indistinguishable from gs otherwise.
3. mw and fp (ce) are consistently indistinguishable.
4. mf, nr, and bp are consistently indistinguishable from each other, except
for w = 2.0, where bp is better than nr.
5. bp and bl are consistently indistinguishable, except for w = 4.0, where bp
is better.
Fig. 2 summarizes our experimental results for a class of Ising models which
appears to lead to “harder” Ising-model instances. 29 We perform hypothesis
testing for the result in these classes of Ising models using two approaches de-
pending on w. For w = 4, where we draw 50 models as samples for each q,
we use appropriately modified paired z-tests on the individual (i.e., not joint)
differences, each with p-value 0.05. We modify the calculation of the variances
resulting from the average over the samples computed for each q. We do so
because the distributional properties of the empirical meanaverage for each q
may differ. For w < 4, where we only draw 5 models as samples for each q,
we use bootstrapped-based, individual, paired hypothesis-testing over each pair
of aggregate differences between the methods for each of those values of w; we
use 100 bootstrap samples, and p-value 0.05 All the statements are statistically
significant with respect to such hypothesis tests.
Aggregate results for 12x12 (Bottom left plot, Fig. 2). The bottom
left-hand plot in Fig. 2 shows the aggregate results for this case. There is no
clear overall best over all q. We also observe the following.
1. fp (ce) is best among all methods except for when w = 2.0, where gs is
better.
2. trw is second best among all methods, except for when w = 2.0, where it
is third best (behind fp (ce) and gs).
3. bp is consistently better than mf and nr except when w = 3.5, where it is
indistinguishable from nr (but still better than mf).
4. mf is consistently worse than bl, except when w = 4.0, where they are
indistinguishable. nr is also consistently worse than bl, except when w =
2.5, where they are indistinguishable
5. gs is consistently better than mf, nr, and bl, except when w = 4.0, where
gs and bl are indistinguishable.
6. mw is better than bl when w < 3.5, but indistinguishable from bl when
w ≥ 3.5.
29Such class of models follows from our general experience with similar models. We find
that instantiating Ising model parameters using densities over edge-weights tended to yield to
relatively easier models than the ones we obtain by fixing the magnitude of the edge-weights
and varying the probability of their sign, independently for each edge.
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Results for constant edge-weight magnitude w = 4 as a function of
probability of attractive interaction q (Right plots, Fig. 2). The right-
hand plots in Fig. 2 shows finer-grain results for this case, for both the 8x8
and 12x12 models. The results suggest that in fact such instances of Ising
models tend to be harder in the sense that even state-of-the-art algorithms such
as trw are no better than the simple baseline estimation, in which p̂i = 0.5
for all nodes/variables i, for about half of the full range of values of the sign
probability q (i.e., for q ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9}). In fact, the performance
of trw is almost exactly the same as baseline across the range of non-extreme
values of q. (Note how the plot of the values for trw and bl are essentially on top
of each other for values of q other than 0 or 1.) On the other hand, note how fp
(ce) is consistently better than bl across the whole range of values for q. In fact,
fp (ce) is always in the set of (statistically) best performers for all q with the
exception of q ∈ {0.0, 1.0}, where trw is better. Almost all the methods other
than fp (ce) are no better, and often worse, than bl. Two notable exceptions
are that trw and mw beat bl only when q ∈ {0.0, 1.0}. Also, mw and fp (ce) are
indistinguishable, except for q ∈ {0.0, 1.0} where fp (ce) is better.
Fig. 3 plots the proportion of non-convergent runs of bp (higher curve) and
trw (lower curve). Note the interesting behavior of bp: the likelihood of conver-
gence diminishes considerably as q nears 0.5. The effect is almost symmetrical.
In contrast, the effect on the non-convergence of trw is negligible. Note, however,
that the bp’s non-convergence does not seem to really affect its performance in
terms of marginal error. This plot provides additional evidence for our claim
that the generative model of random Ising models used for evaluation does lead
to harder problem instances.
Results for the effect of different types of no-regret algorithms. Fig. 5
shows the results of various types of no-regret algorithms based on the multiplicative-
weights algorithm. The variants result from the combination of (a) external vs.
swap regret and (b) exact vs. approximate no-regret guarantees. The take-home
message is that the version for external regret with approximate no-regret guar-
antees, which we refer to both as ’mw’ and ’mw er’ throughout this section, is
consistently better or no worse than the others, as we stated at the beginning of
this subsection (second paragraph). This result appears counter-intuitive given
that such variant has the lowest guarantees in terms of optimality/equilibrium
conditions. Said differently, the possible set of solutions is largest among all vari-
ants. An analogy with gradient-descent based optimizations in other machine-
learning contexts may provide a possible explanation for this behavior. For
example, it is well known that reducing the learning rate or step size in inverse
proportion to the number of iterations when learning neural networks via back-
prop theoretically guarantees convergence in parameter (weight) space. Yet, it
is equally well-known that doing so is often slow in practice, and that using a
small contant as the learning rate tends to lead to faster convergene to good
models, despite the lack of theoretical guarantees. We refer the reader to the
caption in Fig. 5 for further discussion.
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Results on the effect of the number of iterations. Finally, Fig. 4 shows
the marginal error of the estimates obtained by fp (ce), for different numbers
of iterations. Increasing the number of iterations from m = 15 to m = 50
(and greater) only yields minimal improvement in marginal error. In addition,
each run of fp results in pretty consistent marginal errors at each iteration level.
Based on this, it appears that fp converges to an estimate in a fairly low number
of iterations, and does so consistently. Compare this with Fig. 6, which shows
two similar plots each for the trw and gs algorithms. Though trw results in a
comparable average marginal error, the marginal error of each run varies more
than in fp. Increasing the number of iterations for trw does not decrease this
variance, either. The same behavior occurs with gs, though its average marginal
error is a bit higher than trw and fp.
4.3 Experimental Design: MNIST-based Ising Models
We also evaluated the various algorithms on Ising models for more realistic
settings. We use images of handwritten digits from the popular MNIST dataset
to build Ising models for soft de-noising. Note that the interest here is not
classification nor MAP estimation, but belief inference: using the individual
marginal probabilities as confidence measure on the individual pixel values of
the de-noised image. The images consist of 28x28 pixel images, so our Ising
models are 28x28 simple planar grid graphs, as in the synthetic experiments.
The grayscale pixel values in the original MNIST images are converted to black
(+1) and white (−1) values, using a threshold of 0.5. Rather than randomly
setting edge weights, we compute the average product between neighboring
pixels, taken across all training images, then use that average product as the
edge-weight between those neighboring pixels. That is, denote by Il the matrix
representation of the l-th image in the MNIST training dataset, and denote by
m the number of images in that training dataset. We set the weight w(i,j),(i,j+1)
of the edge between nodes/pixels (i, j) and (i, j + 1), for example,
w(i,j),(i,j+1) ∝ 1
m
m∑
l=1
Il(i, j + 1) Il(i, j)
values. and the prior bias b(i,j) for node/pixel (i, j), for example, as
b(i,j) ∝ 1
m
m∑
l=1
Il(i, j) ,
and the normalization factor is such that max(i,j) |b(i,j)| = 1. We select 100 im-
ages uniformly at random from the MNIST test dataset, and apply the thresh-
olding described above to turn them into a BW images. We add 5% noise to
each of the resulting BW images by ”flipping” each pixel value independently
with probability p = 0.05. Hence, we have a different Ising model for each im-
age: the edge weights are all the same, but the biases differ depending on the
specific value of the test image. That is, if I denotes the matrix representation
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of the noisy BW test image, then the Gibbs potential of the Ising model becomes
ΨI(x) ≡
∑
((i,j),(r,s))∈E w˜(i,j),(r,s) x(i,j) x(r,s) +
∑
(i, j)˜b(i,j)(I(i, j))x(i,j) , where
w˜(i,j),(r,s) ∝ w(i,j),(r,s) and b˜(i,j)(I(i, j)) ∝ b(i,j) + 12I(i, j) ln 1−pp , and the nor-
malization factor is such that max(i,j) |˜b(i,j)(I(i, j))| = 1 (for consistency with
the node biases of Ising models in the synthetic experiments).
We ran the exact same algorithms on the constructed Ising models as in
the synthetic experiments, though we used a slightly different number of (max)
iterations: 100 for fp (all variants); 104 for bp, nr, and mw (all variants); 105
for trw and gs; and 106 for mf.
4.4 Experimental Results: MNIST-based Ising Models
Fig. 7 shows our results of the experimental evaluation of the algorithms de-
scribed in earlier sections (with the exception of gs). Like in the synthetic
experiments, we perform hypothesis testing using paired z-tests on the individ-
ual differences, each with p-value 0.05. It is important to note that statements
in this section comparing algorithm performance are always made with respect
to gs. That is, the better performing algorithms here are actually producing
output most similar to gs.
The computed edge-weights for the Ising models derived from MNIST images
actually consist of all positive values, so this experiment can be thought of as
analogous to the “attractive” case in the synthetic experiments. However, as
evidenced in Fig. 7, the MNIST-derived models appear to be much “easier”
than the synthetic models, since every algorithm performs much better than
baseline. For example, mf has very low marginal error in this case, even though
in the synthetic experiments it was often indistinguishable from bl. In order,
the best performing algorithms are 1) bp, 2) trw, 3) mf, 4) mw er, 5) mw er cf,
6) fp, 7) nr, 8) mw sr, 9) mw sr cf, and 10) bl.
Fig. 7 shows our results for the case of Ising models for the Handwritten
Digit ”1” only. That is, the edge weights were computed using only images
in the MNIST dataset with a training label of the ”1” digit. Likewise, the
observed image samples came only from images in the test data set with a label
of the ”1” digit. The figure shows that while the various algorithms have the
same relative order to each other when run on ”1’s” vs ”all” digits, the range
of average marginal errors they achieved tightened.
5 Future Work and New Opportunities
It would be nice to have a better understanding of the exact relationship between
the true joint distribution of the MRF and the equilibrium points of the induced
graphical potential game. For example, it is known that no-external-regret-
based algorithms like mw converge to PSNE in “generic” potential games [Klein-
berg et al., 2009], such as the MRF-induced game. In fact, we observe such
consistent convergence to PSNE by mw in our experiments, which is unlike the
behavior we observed for fp (ce). But convergence to PSNE means that we are
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essentially approximating the whole distribution with a single joint assignment
(i.e., a point mass). Yet, mw can outperform state-of-the-art algorithms like
trw, particularly on “hard” instances, despite yielding such extremely coarse ap-
proximations. In addition, best-response dynamics in the MRF-induced game
converges to a PSNE and is equivalent to the method of iterated conditional
modes (ICM) [Besag, 1986] in PGMs, which converges to a locally optimal joint
assignment of the original MRF. We did not include ICM in our experiments
because it is generally considered inferior to other methods. The results of mw
suggests we might want to also evaluate ICM for hard instances and compare its
output and performance to that of mw. One interesting question is whether mw
often finds better local minima that ICM, or whether ICM is equally effective,
in those hard cases. As another example of how the proposed study would be
useful, it might give us a better idea as to whether one can think of a Gibbs
sampler, or other Monte-Carlo sampling algorithms, as providing solutions to
equilibrium problems of certain quality.
Here we establish a connection between mf and MSNE. Despite the fact that
mf often provides poor approximations, even worst than baseline in many cases,
it would still be theoretically interesting to study the relationship between the
output of mf and that of algorithms that compute approximate MSNE in loopy
graphical games, such as NashProp [Ortiz and Kearns, 2003].
The focus of the experimental evaluation in this paper was testing our pro-
posed, game-theoretically-inspired algorithms for belief inference with standard
algorithms in the literature of probabilistic graphical models with relatively
“simple” implementations (e.g., do not require calls to software packages or
the implementation of complex optimizations). An empirical study involving
such algorithms with considerably more complex implementations must have
a precise experimental methodology and design that accounts for not only the
complexity of implementation, but also a fair comparison that achieves the right
balance between measures of solution quality and running times. We leave such
evaluations for future work because of the level of complexity required to carry
them out correctly.
The work in this paper just “scratches the surface” in terms of the synergy
between equilibirum computation in game theory and belief inference in prob-
abilistic graphical models. We state and discuss several immediate theoretical,
algorithmic, and computational implications, but many more may be possible.
An even broader and more thorough literature review than the one provided
in this manuscript is necessary to fully exploit this connection. Thus, many
opportunities for novel contributions remain available in either direction.
6 Contributions and Concluding Remarks
We provide general formulations of the problem of inference in MRFs as equi-
librium computation in graphical potential games. We provide connections,
particularly to variational inference approaches, with immediate algorithmic,
computational, and theoretical implications to belief inference in probabilistic
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graphical models that follow immediately from the game-theory literature to
various related problems. We provide two approaches for approximate belief
inference: a local and a global approach. We experimentally evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed algorithms in the context of Ising models with grid
graphs, and provide a characterization of their computational effectiveness based
on common measures used to characterize classes of Ising models (e.g., mixed
and attractive models with different relative levels of magnitude between the
edge weights and node bias values). We also empirically evaluate effectiveness
using a slightly different approach in which we keep the edge-weight magnitude
constant but vary the “sign probability.” We show how most methods are often
not much better than a simple baseline (i.e., estimate that the marginal prob-
abilities are all equal to 0.5) in that class of Ising models. Our results suggest
that the proposed class of Ising models does indeed lead to harder instances
than the popular models used for empirical evaluation in the same context of
Ising models. We empirically show that our proposed method based on a global
approach is best, beating even TRW within that class, and shinning in a class
of Ising models with constant, “highly attractive” edge-weights, in which it is
often better than all other alternatives we evaluated. Note that TRW is gener-
ally considered state-of-the-art. We propose such class of Ising models for future
evaluations because our experimental results suggest that instances from that
class are often the hardest. While our more local approach is not as effective as
our global approach or TRW, in fairness, almost all of the alternatives were no
better than a simple baseline: estimate the marginal probability to be 0.5.
Some reviewers have expressed the view that our general equilibrium-based
approach to approximate inference is “limited to locally optimal solutions to
inference problems.” We would like to point that almost all approaches to
approximate inference based on variational approximation employed in practice,
including simple methods such as mean field and state-of-the-art methods such
as TRW, suffer from exactly the same limitations.
In closing, our hope is that the work we present in this manuscript will
start a conversation on the synergy between equilibrium computation and be-
lief inference. We believe our work and results establish sufficient precedent
for research in the direction of formulating probabilistic inference problems as
problems of equilibrium computation. We believe this research direction is sci-
entifically intriguing and potentially fruitful for mathematical, algorithmic, and
computational game-theory, as well as for probabilistic graphical models.
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A Experimental Results and Discussion for 8x8
Grids
Fig. 1 summarizes our results for the most common classes of Ising models con-
sidered in the experimental evaluation of approximation algorithms and heuris-
tic for belief inference in the literature as described above. We perform hypoth-
esis testing for the result in these classes of Ising models using paired z-tests
on the individual (i.e., not joint) differences, each with p-value 0.05. Hence, all
the statements are statistically significant with respect to such hypotesis tests.
Note that there is no globally best approximation technique overall for these
classes.
“Mixed” case (Left plot, Fig. 1). Clearly, gs is best for all w in this case.
Among the other approximation algorithms, we observe the following
1. fp (ce) is best and better than bp for w = 4, indistinguishable from bp for
w = 3, and worst than bp for w = 2 where bp is best.
2. fp (ce) is consistently better than trw.
3. trw is worst than bp for w < 4, but better than bp for w = 4.
4. All methods, except for mf and nr, are consistently better than bl; mf
and nr are consistently worst than bl, except for w = 2 where mf is
indistinguishable from bl.
5. mf and nr are indistinguishable, except for w = 4 where nr is better than
mf.
“Attractive” case (Right plot, Fig. 1). In this case, there is no clear
overall best. We also observe the following.
1. trw is best among all methods except for w = 2 where gs is best, and trw
is second best.
2. fp (ce) is better than all other methods, except trw, and gs for w = 2; and
bp for w < 4 where fp (ce) is indistinguishable from bp.
3. mf, nr, bp, and gs are consistently indistinguishable from bl, and from
each other; except for w = 2 where gs is best, of course.
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Fig. 2 summarizes our experimental results for a class of Ising models which
appears to lead to “harder” Ising-model instances. 30 We perform hypothesis
testing for the result in these classes of Ising models using two approaches de-
pending on w. For w = 4, where we draw 50 models as samples for each q,
we use appropriately modified paired z-tests on the individual (i.e., not joint)
differences, each with p-value 0.05. We modify the calculation of the variances
resulting from the average over the samples computed for each q. We do so
because the distributional properties of the empirical mean/average for each q
may differ. For w < 4, where we only draw 5 models as samples for each q,
we use bootstrapped-based, individual, paired hypothesis-testing over each pair
of aggregate differences between the methods for each of those values of w; we
use 100 bootstrap samples, and p-value 0.05 All the statements are statistically
significant with respect to such hypotesis tests.
Aggregate results (Left plot, Fig. 2). The left-hand plot in Fig. 2 shows
the aggregate results for this case. There is no clear overall best over all q. We
also observe the following.
1. fp (ce) is best for w = 4 and w = 3, while being second best to gs for
w = 2; and, for w = 2.5, tied for best with gs (i.e., indistinguishable from
gs).
2. trw is consistently better than bp, mf, bl, and nr, except for w = 2.5 where
trw is indistinguishable from bp; trw is consistently worst than fp (ce)
3. Only mf is worst than bl for w ∈ {2, 4}; mf is indistinguishable from bl
for w ∈ {2.5, 3}; also, bp and nr are indistinguishable from bl, except for
w = 2.5, where bp is better than bl.
4. bp is better than mf except for w = 2; bp is indistinguishable from nr for
w ∈ {2, 3}, but bp is better than nr for w ∈ {2.5, 4}.
5. gs is consistently better than mf and nr; indistinguishable from trw, ex-
cept, of course, for w = 2 where gs is tied for best with fp (ce).
Results for constant edge-weight magnitude w = 4 as a function
of probability of attractive interaction q (Right plot, Fig. 2). The
right-hand plot in Fig. 2 shows finer-grain results for this case. The results
suggest that in fact such instances of Ising models tend to be harder in the
sense that even state-of-the-art algorithms such as TRW are no better than
the simple baseline estimation, in which p̂i = 0.5 for all nodes/variables i,
for less than half of the full range of values of the sign probability q (i.e., for
q ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9}). In fact, the performance of TRW is almost ex-
actly the same as baseline accros the range of non-extreme values of q. (Note
30Such class of models follows from our general experience with similar models. We find
that instantiating Ising model parameters using densities over edge-weights tended to yield to
relatively easier models than the ones we obtain by fixing the magnitude of the edge-weights
and varying the probability of their sign, independently for each edge.
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how the plot of the values for trw and bl are essentially on top of each other
for values of q other than 0 or 1.) On the other hand, note how fp (ce) is con-
sistently better than bl across the whole range of values for q. In fact, fp (ce)
is always in the set of (statistically) best performers for all q: i.e., the single
best for q = 1.0, and indistinguishable from trw for q = 0.0; gs and bp for
q ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7}; nr, gs, and bp for q = 0.2; gs for q ∈ {0.3, 0.4, 0.9}; and
gs and mf for q = 0.8. The proposed fp (ce) is also best at both extremes, while
trw is only best when all weights are negative. Almost all the methods other
than fp (ce) are no better, and often worst, than bl, except for bp and trw for
q = 0.0; trw for q ∈ {0.2, 0.7, 1.0}; trw and gs for q = 0.3; and gs for q = 0.8.
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Figure 1: Standard Evaluation on Ising Models with 8x8 and 12x12
Grids. The left and right plots are for the so-called “mixed” and “attractive”
instances of Ising models, respectively. For all plots, the x-axis is the largest
magnitude of the edge-weights: i.e., w = max(i,j)∈E |wij |. The y-axis is the
average, over 50 randomly generated Ising models, of the average, over all of
the 144 variables, of the absolute difference between the estimate and exact
marginal probability for the random variable corresponding to that node, along
with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs). The legend in each
plot is for different approximation algorithms: bl = baseline; mf = mean field;
bp = belief propagation; trw = tree reweighed message-passing; nr = simple
no-regret algorithm; gs = Gibbs sampler; mw = multiplicative weights; and
fp (ce) = the CE version of our version of the fictitious play for the 2-player
potential game described in Section 3.4. We refer the reader to the main body
for implementation details and a thorough discussion of the results.
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Figure 2: Evaluation on Ising Models with 8x8 and 12x12 Grids, Uniform
Interaction Magnitude, and Varied Probability of Attractive Interactions.
(Left plots) The x-axis, y-axis, and legend are as in Fig. 1, except the edge-weight
magnitude w is constant for each interaction strength in the x-axis (i.e., 2, 2.5, 3, and
4), and nr uses 106 iterations. For all cases, the result is the average over all values
of the probability of attractive interaction q ∈ {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0}, and over 5 Ising
models for each q; except for the case of constant edge-weight magnitude w = 4, in
which case the average for each q is over 50 Ising-model samples. Said differently, the
overal average for the cases of w ∈ {2.0, 2.5, 3.0} is over a total of 55 Ising models,
while those for the case of w = 4 is over a total of 550 models. Note that the standard
95% CIs based on a Gaussian approximation resulting from the Central Limit Theorem
(CLT) do not directly apply here because the averages are over different q values, each
of which may have different distributional properties (e.g., different variances). For
w < 4, because we are computing the average marginal-error over every q, each based
on only 5 samples, we use the bootstrap method to compute the 95% CIs over the
overall average for each method and each w, using 100 samples. For w = 4, because
we have 50 samples for each q, we use a properly adapted version of the standard 95%
CIs which modifies the calculation of the overall variance to account for distributional
differences from each q. (Right plots) Results for each q value with w = 4, with
50 models as samples for each, along with their corresponding individual 95% CIs
computed as usual. We refer the reader to the main body for a thorough discussion.
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Figure 3: Evaluation on Ising Models with 8x8 Grids, Uniform In-
teraction Magnitude (w= 4), and Varied Probability of Attractive
Interactions q: Proportion of Non-convergent BP and TRW Runs.
This plot shows proportion, along with standard individual 95% CIs, of non-
convergent runs (y-axis) of bp (higher curve) and trw (lower curve), as a function
of the probability of attractive interaction q (x-axis) for Ising models with con-
stant edge-weights magnitude equal to 4. The setup is as described in the right
plot of Fig. 2 for the case of edge-weight magnitude w = 4. The proportion is
out of 50 runs for each q ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9, 1}. Note how the convergence
of bp degrades when q nears 0.5. Note the almost symmetric effect on non-
convergence for bp. Note also that bp non-convergence seems uncorrelated with
its performance, as shown in Fig. 2 (Right plot). While trw may also show non-
convergence outside non-uniform edge-weights, the effect is less drastic than for
bp.
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Figure 4: Evaluation on Ising Models with 12x12 Grids, Uniform In-
teraction Magnitude (w= 4), and Varied Probability of Attractive
Interactions: Marginal Error of fp (ce) by Number of Iterations. This
plot shows the marginal error of the estimates obtained by the fp algorithm, for
different numbers of iterations used in the algorithm. The x-axis is the num-
ber of iterations m, while the y-axis is the same as in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The
marginal error of each run is represented by a circle on the graph. Each run
is the result of averaging over all values of the probability of attractive interac-
tion q ∈ {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0}. The average marginal error is shown as a line,
and is obtained from 20 randomly generated Ising models and corresponding
estimates. The number of iterations used were m ∈ {15, 50, 100, 200, 500}.
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Figure 5: Evaluation on Ising Models with 12x12 Grids, Multiplicative
Weights Algorithms. The top plots are the same as those in Fig. 1 and the
bottom plots are the same as those in Fig. 2, with the exception that only multi-
plicative weights algorithms are included in these plots (along with the baseline
algorithm). The legend is as follows: mw er = external regret minimization;
mw er cf = external regret minimization using a constant η = 0.01; mw sr =
swap regret minimization; mw sr cf = swap regret minimization using a con-
stant η = 0.01. We refer the reader to the main body for more details regarding
the implementation of these algorithms.
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Figure 6: Evaluation on Ising Models with 12x12 Grids, Uniform In-
teraction Magnitude (w= 4), and Varied Probability of Attractive
Interactions: Marginal Error of trw and gs by Number of Iterations.
This plot shows the marginal error of the estimates obtained by the trw (top
plots) and gs (bottom plots) algorithms, for different numbers of iterations. The
axes are the same as in Fig. 4. Note that the right plots use a logarithmic
scale for the number of iterations. The number of iterations used in the left
plots were m ∈ {15, 50, 100, 200, 500}, and m ∈ {102, 103, 104, 105} for the right
plots. The marginal error of each run (circles) and the average marginal error
(line) were found using the same procedure as in Fig. 4.
52
Figure 7: Evaluation on Ising Models Derived from MNIST Images,
28x28 Grids. This box plot compares the marginal errors of all algorithms
with respect to gs. Because each algorithm was run on 100 image samples,
each box consists of 100 average (over 282 = 784 variables) marginal errors.
Data points that are more than 1.5 times the interquartile range away from the
median are considered outliers, and are drawn as short lines. The “whiskers” of
the boxes are drawn as long lines.
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Figure 8: Evaluation on Ising Models Derived from MNIST Images of
Handwritten Digit ”1” Only, 28x28 Grids. This box plot compares the
marginal errors of all algorithms with respect to gs. Because each algorithm
was run on 100 image samples, each box consists of 100 average (over 282 =
784 variables) marginal errors. Data points that are more than 1.5 times the
interquartile range away from the median are considered outliers, and are drawn
as short lines. The “whiskers” of the boxes are drawn as long lines.
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